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OLMSTEAD V. L.C.,' decided by the United States Su-
preme Court in 1999, represents a watershed in the interpreta-
tion of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA or the Act)2
as it applies to publicly operated services. The immediate focus
of the case was on whether medically unjustifiable institution-
alization of persons with disabilities, who can appropriately re-
ceive treatment in the community and who desire to do so, con-
stitutes discrimination under Title II of the ADA. But
Olmstead's true importance from a health policy perspective
lies in its long-term potential to secure realignment of public
spending on health services for persons with disabilities.
The Olmstead decision is hardly the first time that the na-
tion has confronted its tendency to skew public expenditures on
persons with disabilities toward institutional settings and away
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from full community integration.3 At the same time, the case
has garnered considerable attention among policy makers and
program analysts, perhaps in part because of the short memory
span that policy analysts can possess, but in large part because
of its seemingly direct implications for Medicaid,4 the nation's
largest means-tested entitlement program.
Olmstead is emphatically not a Medicaid case. In the end,
however, because the integration of persons with disabilities
into the community depends so heavily on how States approach
Medicaid financing, discussions about Olmstead quickly be-
come discussions about Medicaid. Indeed, in implementing the
decision, the United States Department of Health and Human
Services assigned joint responsibility to the Office for Civil
Rights and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 5 the
federal agency charged with administration of the Medicaid
program.
In spite of its apparent reach, Olmstead is in fact far
tougher to analyze in relation to Medicaid than would seem to
be the case. The standards established under the majority deci-
sion for measuring when statutory violations under the ADA
occur in the context of health services for persons with disabili-
ties are, in fact, quite murky; furthermore, the powers granted to
States to determine the scope of their own obligations, as well
as the affirmative defenses they are accorded, are extensive. As
a result, while Olmstead is a ringing restatement of policy for
persons with disabilities-and one that grows out of a half-
century of efforts to reorient U.S. social welfare in this area-
its actual reach may be more limited. The critical issue becomes
how the courts ultimately reconcile the discretion and defenses
accorded state officials under the opinion with the Court's ulti-
3 See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (hold-
ing that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act did not cre-
ate substantive rights which would require Pennsylvania to close it state-operated
school for the mentally retarded in favor of community living arrangements); Wyatt
v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (stating that 'It]he failure to provide
suitable and adequate treatment to the mentally ill cannot be justified by lack of staff
or facilities"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974).
4 See infra Part IV.
5 As of July 1, 2001, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) is the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDI-
CAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVS., INTRODUCING CMS (n.d.),
at http/cms.hhs.gov/about/reorg.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2001).
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mate edict that integration occur and that it do so at a "reason-
able pace."6 Much like other seminal civil rights decisions, the
Olmstead Court sought to couple basic statements about the
proper course of long-term public conduct with cautionary steps
designed to protect against what it feared would be an exces-
sively rapid pace of change that could harm the very individuals
the Court sought to help. It is in this balancing of interests that
the future course of publicly funded health care for persons with
disabilities will be charted.
Part II of this article provides an overview of the ADA and
the Olmstead decision, and an examination of the federal ad-
ministrative response to the decision as of the summer of 2001.
Part III presents the results of a special study designed to gauge
the individual circumstances that underlie "most integrated set-
ting" administrative complaints filed under Title II of the ADA.
Part IV discusses a companion line of Medicaid cases that ad-
dress the right of individuals to prompt treatment in a commu-
nity setting, as well as recent legal developments related to the
ability of individuals to enforce federal rights against state offi-
cials through actions for prospective injunctive relief. We con-
clude in Part V with observations about the profound and unan-
swered legal questions raised by the decision, as well as the
broader meaning of Olmstead for long-term U.S. policy regard-
ing the integration of persons with disabilities into community
settings.
H. THE ADA, TIE OLMSTEAD DECISION, AND
THE FEDERAL AGENCY RESPONSE TO
OLMSTEAD
A. An Overview of the Americans With Disabilities Act
The ADA-the most significant piece of civil rights legis-
lation since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 -was
intended "to provide a clear and comprehensive national man-
date for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities."8 The Act expands upon the ideas set forth in §
6 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 606.
7 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 24 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).8 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 9 which prohibits
discrimination against an "otherwise qualified" individual
solely on the basis of the individual's disability, in any program
or activity that receives federal financial assistance.10 The ADA
broadened this proscription by clarifying the reach of the term
"disability", retaining the "otherwise qualified" structure of the
earlier law, and most significantly, by encompassing the con-
duct of not only government-sponsored programs and services,
but also of employers and private entities open to the public. At
the time of enactment, it was estimated that the ADA would ex-
tend these expanded protections to some forty-three million per-
sons with disabilities.11 Enacted as broad remedial legislation
aimed at combating persistent discrimination against "individu-
als with disabilities . . . in such critical areas as ...housing,
public accommodations, education, transportation, communica-
tion,... institutionalization, health services .... and access to
public services,"' 12 the ADA consists of several Titles. Title I
covers employers as well as employer-sponsored benefits. 3 Ti-
tle III applies to places of public accommodation. 14 Title II, the
portion of the Act at issue in Olmstead, applies to publicly op-
9 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).1OaI
" See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 121 S. Ct. 681, 691 (2002)
(discussing Congress's findings); Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484
(1999) (same).
12 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
13 See, e.g., Carparts Distrib. Ctr, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of
New Eng., Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding the proper issue in the case to be
"not whether defendants were employers of [plaintiff] within the common sense of
the word, but whether they can be considered 'employers' for purposes of Title I of
the ADA and therefore subject to liability for discriminatorily denying employment
benefits to [plaintiff]").
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability regarding "any place of public accommodation"). Un-
der the Act, places of public accommodation include the private offices of health care
providers. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (finding HIV-infected
dental patient had a disability under the ADA, but remanding to determine if the pa-
tient having her cavity filled at the dentist's office, rather than the hospital, would
pose a direct threat to the health and safety of others). A series of rulings have con-
cluded, however, that the ADA does not reach the content of private health insurance.
See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding insur-
ance policies that put a cap on medical care benefits for those with HIV did not vio-
late the Act); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (permit-
ting employer to provide a disability plan which was more favorable to the physically
disabled than the mentally disabled).
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erated and funded programs and entities.15 Title II provides in
pertinent part: "[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in
or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities
of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity."'16 "The term 'qualified individual with a disability'
means an individual with a disability who, with or without rea-
sonable modifications' 7 to rules, policies, or practices.., meets
the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services
or the participation in programs or activities provided by a pub-
lic entity."'" "The term 'disability' means ... physical or men-
tal impairment 19 that substantially limits one or more of the ma-
jor life activities of [an] individual; a record of such an impair-
ment; or being regarded as having such an impairment.
20
A public entity is "any State or local government" or "any
department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumen-
tality of a State or States or local government.",2 1 As such, Title
II covers health care financing and service delivery programs
administered by state agencies.
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994 & Supp V 1999). Incidentally, Title IV ap-
plies to transportation. See id § 12184. Title V includes several miscellaneous provi-
sions. See id. § 12201.
16 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
17 See infra Part IV (discussing reasonable modifications).
1 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
19 Disability includes: "Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body sys-
tems: Neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and
lymphatic, skin, and endocrine" and "[any mental or psychological disorder such as
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities." 28 C.F.R. §35.104 (2001). "[Included are] contagious and non-
contagious diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impair-
ments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart
disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, specific learning disabilities,
HIV disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addiction,
and alcoholism." Id. The following conditions are not included in the definition of
disability: homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, ex-
hibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical im-
pairments, or other sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or
pyromania, or psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use
of drugs. 42 U.S.C. § 12211.
20 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). "Major life activities" includes "caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working." 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2001).
21 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)-(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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As part of their mandate not to discriminate against indi-
viduals with disabilities, public entities are required to make
"reasonable modifications" to their programs, offer their ser-
vices in the "most integrated setting," and permit freedom of
choice when offering their services to persons with disabilities:
A public entity shall make reasonable modifica-
tions in policies, practices, or procedures when the
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on
the basis of disability ....
A public entity shall administer services, programs,
and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate
to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.
Nothing ... shall be construed to require an indi-
vidual with a disability to accept an accommodation,
aid, service, opportunity, or benefit provided under the
ADA... which such individual chooses not to accept.
22
At the same time, however, the Act recognizes certain basic
limitations on the obligation of public entities to modify their
"policies, practices, or procedures." 23 No modification is re-
quired if "the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the ser-
vice, program, or activity,,24
In sum, Title II of the ADA focuses on publicly adminis-
tered programs and services. Its basic goal is to ensure that rea-
sonable modifications are made in public programs that serve
qualified (i.e., eligible) persons with disabilities in order to af-
ford them an opportunity to receive services in the most inte-
grated setting possible. At the same time, public agencies do not
have to "fundamentally alter" their programs in order to achieve
the goal of promoting integration. Federal law places the burden
of proof on a public agency whose policies, practices, and pro-
22 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7), (d)-(e)-I (2001).
23 IL § 35.130(b)(7).
24 id.
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cedures are challenged to demonstrate why a requested altera-
tion amounts to a fundamental alteration. The term "policies,
practices, and procedures" is not defined in the Act.
B. An Overview of the Olmstead Decision
Olmstead v. L.C. arose in Georgia and involved two women
who experienced various mental disabilities and were institu-
tionalized in a state inpatient psychiatric hospital. In the cases
of both women, state medical employees had deemed commu-
nity services appropriate25 and both women desired to receive
services in an integrated setting.2 6 As set forth in the majority
opinion, the facts also showed that as part of its State Medicaid
plan, Georgia's Medicaid agency operated a "home and com-
munity-based waiver" program. 27 This program provided com-
munity-based health care and support services for persons
deemed at risk of institutionalization. However, although the
federal government had approved 2109 individual community
placements under the State's program, the agency in fact had
filled only 700 of those slots as a result of persistent legislative
under-funding of this portion of its state plan.2 8 (Persistent un-
der-financing of community services is a nationwide problem in
Medicaid; at the time of the decision, every State except Ari-
zona operated at least one home and community care program
for one or more classes of persons with disabilities.2 9 In most
States the number of federally approved community placement
slots significantly exceeded available funding from the legisla-
ture).30 Georgia also maintained a waiting list for available
community services.
25 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999).
26 See id. at 594.
27 See id. at 595.28 Id. at 601.
29 STEVEN LuTzKY ET AL., LEwIN GROUP, INC., REVIEW OF THE MEDICAID
1915(c) HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES WAIVER PROGRAM LITERATURE
AND PROGRAM DATA 5-6 (June 2000), available at http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/
litfinal.pdf.
It should be noted that under-funding may not simply be an act of mean-
spirited denial by a legislature but may stem from the severe shortage of personnel
and resources to furnish care in communities. The causes of these shortages are nu-
merous. See generally Jane Perkins & Randolph T. Boyle, Addressing LaPng Waits for
Home and Community-Based Care Through Medicaid and the ADA, 45 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 117 (2001) (discussing the shortage of community long-term care services).
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Additional background facts that also are essential to un-
derstanding the Olmstead decision and reasoning involve the
Medicaid program's financing arrangements. Under federal law,
in fiscal year 2000, for example, the benefits and services in-
cluded in Georgia's approved state plan qualified for a federal
financial assistance rate of 59.88% of total state expenditures in
meeting the cost of such assistance.31 In other words, for every
dollar the State spent on federally approved medical assistance
services (such as home and community care services), the State
received nearly $.60 in federal contributions. Conversely, inpa-
tient psychiatric services for non-elderly adults (under age
sixty-five), when furnished in an "institution for mental dis-
eases" do not qualify for any federal medical assistance contri-
butions under federal law because of special statutory exclu-
sionary rules. 32 As a result, the cost of institutionalizing the
plaintiffs in Olmstead was effectively borne entirely by the
State, while the cost of their community care potentially would
have been borne approximately 60% by the federal government
(assuming Georgia's federal matching rate did not change dras-
tically in the years during which the litigation was ongoing).
These underlying facts made it difficult to justify the women's
continued confinement from either a medical or economic
viewpoint.
In sum, the facts of the case were compelling: the State ap-
parently had chosen to spend its public funds to inappropriately
and, from a medical perspective, unjustifiably institutionalize
the two plaintiffs, even though the State's own employees had
deemed their placement in community residence appropriate.
Furthermore, the State apparently had chosen to under-fund
federally approved community services eligible for high rates of
federal financial contributions, while paying the full cost of in-
313 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 14,905 (Mar. 16, 1999).
32 42 C.F.R. § 435.1008(a)(2) (2000). The so-called IMD exclusion, included
in the original Medicaid statute, was included as a means of preventing States from
federalizing the cost of their mental institutions using Medicaid funds. The exclusion
was an ealy testament to the growing body of federal policies away from institu-
tional care and toward community services. Later amendments to the Medicaid stat-
ute expanded state options to furnish community services and permitted States to
claim federal contributions for the cost of services furnished to residents of mental
institutions of fewer than sixteen persons in order to encourage the development of
small-group living arrangements for persons with mental illness.
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stitutional care as an excluded Medicaid item or service. 33 This
decision appeared to run counter to the State's own financial
interest.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, in finding the State's practices discriminatory, also ruled
that the proper standard for determining when a violation oc-
curred under the reasonable modification/fundamental alteration
test lay in comparing the cost of the plaintiffs' institutional care
against the cost of their community care. Under these facts, the
lower court had concluded that the circumstances of the case
required provision of community services to the plaintiffs and
that a cost justification would fail "[u]nless the State can prove
that requiring it to [expend additional funds in order to provide
L.C. and E.W. with integrated services] would be so unreason-
able given the demands of the State's mental health budget that
it would fundamentally alter the service [the State] provides."
34
In a fractured opinion,35 a majority of the Supreme Court
identified the central issue as being "whether the proscription of
discrimination [as embodied in the ADA] may require place-
ment of persons with mental disabilities in community settings
rather than in institutions. 36 Writing for the Court, Justice
Ginsburg stated that "[t]he answer... is a qualified yes."37 The
"qualifiers" set forth in the majority opinion arose not from
questions regarding whether medically unjustifiable institution-
alization constituted precisely the type of conduct the ADA
sought to abolish, but rather from the Court's perceived need to
33 Curiously, one of the State's arguments was that Medicaid encouraged an
institutional bias in the case of persons with mental illness and thus effectively cre-
ated an affirmative defense to plaintiffs' claims. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601. In
fact, Medicaid bars federal financial participation in the case of institutional care for
services for non-elderly adults with mental illness. This would preclude federal cov-
erage of women such as L.C. and E.W., assuming a primary diagnosis of mental ill-
ness and institutionalization in a mental health residential inpatient facility.
34 L.C. ex rel Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 905 (1lth Cir.1998), aff'd
in part, vacated in part, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).35 Justice Ginsburg announced the judgment of the Court with respect to Parts
L II, and 1I-A, in which Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer joined, and
an opinion with respect to Part II-B, in which Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer
joined. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
Justice Breyer joined as to Part L Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which




balance the competing interests of individuals with disabilities
against those of States, whose resources "[are] not boundless" 38
and whose obligations extend to both persons who can live in
the community and those who, in the opinion of state officials,
cannot.
39
Despite protests by the dissenting Justices (Thomas,
Rehnquist, and Scalia) that no "discrimination" occurred as a
matter of law because all persons whose needs were at issue in
the case were "members of the same protected class"40 (i.e.,
persons with disabilities), the majority had little problem in dis-
posing of this assertion. The Court based its discrimination
holding on two facts. First, the Court determined that institu-
tionalizing individuals who can handle and benefit from com-
munity settings perpetuates incorrect assumptions that those
institutionalized are incapable or unworthy of participating in
community life.4' Second, the Court reasoned that unwarranted
institutionalization diminishes individual's capacity for, among
other things, family relations, work options, economic inde-
pendence, and cultural enrichment.42
In citing these two basic justifications for its holding, the
Court emphasized the prevention of unnecessary institutionali-
zation of persons with disabilities as one of the hallmarks of
both the ADA and its predecessor statute, the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (specifically, § 504). In the majority's view, discrimina-
tion occurred because one group of recipients of publicly
funded health services (i.e., persons with disabilities) were fur-
nished with public services only if they agreed to accept their
care on an institutional inpatient basis. Indeed, in the Court's
view (as evidenced by its restatement of the facts of the case),
38 Id. at 603.
39 Advocates for persons with disabilities take fundamental issue with the
notion that any person with a disability is not capable of community residence with
proper services and supports. For example, the American Disabled for Attendant
Programs Today (ADAPT), a national disability rights organization, has drafted S.
1935, the Medicaid Community Attendant Services and Supports Act (MiCASSA),
which would establish a national program of community-based attendant services and
supports for people with disabilities. AM. DISABLED FOR ATTENDANT PROGRAMS To-
DAY, A COMMUNITY-BASED ALTERNATIVE TO NURSING HOMES AND INSTITUTIONS FOR
PEOPLE wrrH DIsABLITIES (n.d.), http://www.adapt.org/casaintr.htm (last visited Oct.
1, 2001). The bill guarantees any individual who is entitled to institutional services to
choose to receive those services in the community. Id.
40 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 616 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
41 Id at 600.
42It at 601.
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the State had gone so far as to systematically under-fund its
community services in order to deny plaintiffs public services in
the most integrated setting.
For the majority, the cumulative facts of the case suggested
that, despite the lack of medical justification, the State had de-
prived plaintiffs of health care in any setting other than in an
institution. Furthermore, although the majority's finding of dis-
crimination did not turn on plaintiffs' particular condition (i.e.,
mental illness and mental retardation), the fact that both L.C.
and E.W. suffered from mental illness was probably critical to
the case as well, given the history of discrimination against per-
sons with mental illness.43 Thus, in the majority's opinion, the
evidence pointed to a deliberate effort on the part of the State to
skew its overall public health care spending patterns by over-
spending in one area and under-spending in another in order to
achieve segregation and isolation of persons with mental illness.
The remedial portion of the majority opinion was far more
ambiguous. In effect, the Court articulated what can be thought
of as an aggregate population standard for measuring when state
conduct amounts to a violation of the ADA and rejected the in-
dividualized test used by the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, the
majority also gave States significant power to determine the
lawfulness of their own performance by empowering them to
identify the very class of individuals who could legitimately
claim a right to community services under the Act. Finally, the
majority broadened the nature of the fundamental alteration de-
fense available to state agencies.
At the same time, the Court tempered this unusual grant of
power to the States with a strong admonition to act with reason-
ableness. In demanding reasonableness the majority took the
highly unusual step of establishing an "outcomes test" of legal
conduct that in effect creates a presumption of unlawful prac-
tices where certain results fail to flow from state practices.
1. The Standard of Conduct
The Court began by setting the context for its holding:
"[W]e recognize.., the States' need to maintain a range of fa-
cilities for the care and treatment of persons with diverse mental
41 See idL at 608-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing "persons with
mental disabilities have been subject to historic mistreatment, indifference, and hos-
tility").
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disabilities, and the States' obligation to administer services
with an even hand."44 The Court then set forth the following
standard for determining when States' practices amount to a
violation of the ADA:
[Release into the community] is in order when the
State's treatment professionals have determined that
community placement is appropriate, the transfer from
institutional care to a less restrictive setting is not op-
posed by the affected individual, and the placement can
be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the
resources available to the State and the needs of others
with mental disabilities.45
This standard thus assigns to States the ultimate power to decide
who can be appropriately served in a community placement and
to make at least the initial determination of when community
placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into ac-
count the needs of the entire group of persons with disabilities
and the availability of resources.
2. A Broadened Affirmative Defense
The Court also broadened the "fundamental alteration" af-
firmative defense available to States. Rejecting the Court of
Appeal's statement of the defense, the majority held:
The State's responsibility, once it provides community-
based treatment to qualified persons with disabilities, is
not boundless. The reasonable-modifications regulation
speaks of "reasonable modifications" to avoid discrimi-
nation, and allows States to resist modifications that en-
tail a "fundamenta[l] alter[ation]" of the States' services
and programs .... Sensibly construed, the fundamental-
alteration component of the reasonable-modifications
regulation would allow the State to show that, in the al-
location of available resources, immediate relief for the
plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the responsibility
the State has undertaken for the care and treatment of a
44 Id at 597.
41 Id at 587.
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large and diverse population of persons with mental dis-
abilities.
46
In evaluating a State's fundamental-alterationodefense,
the [lower courts] must consider, in view of the re-
sources available to the State, not only the cost of pro-
viding community-based care to the litigants, but also
the range of services the State provides others with
mental disabilities, and the State's obligation to mete
out those services equitably.47
This re-formulation of the fundamental alteration defense
makes several things clear. First, it is a matter of discretion for a
State whether to furnish any public service. Second, although
the Court of Appeals focused its assessment of reasonableness
versus fpndamental alteration on the incremental cost of fur-
nishing community services to particular plaintiffs-rather than
to total state spending on health care-the majority altered this
focus to effectively create a "zero sum game" defense. Under
the majority's expanded "fundamental alteration" defense, a
State is entitled to have the plaintiffs' request weighed not
against its total expenditures for health care, but rather against
its expenditures on persons in the protected class (i.e., persons
with disabilities). Thus, even as the majority rejected the notion
that a protected class could not be separately identified for pur-
poses of finding discrimination, the Court also appeared to elect
to measure the legality of the State's conduct against its spend-
ing on the protected class alone; in effect, the Court rejected the
notion that new spending might be required in order to achieve
conformity to the principles of the ADA.
3. Limits on State Defenses
Even as the Court expanded States' affirmative defenses
and empowered States to make critical decisions regarding the
scope of their own obligations, the majority placed a potentially
powerful brake on state discretion over whether, and how fast,
to reorient state budgets for persons with disabilities:
46 l& at 603-04 (alterations in original).
47 Id at 597.
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If... the State were to demonstrate that it had a com-
prehensive, effectively working plan for placing quali-
fied persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive
settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable
pace not'controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its
institutions fully populated, the reasonable modifica-
tions standard would be met.48
In this limitation on a State's discretion, the majority effectively
empowered plaintiffs to demonstrate that despite state asser-
tions to the contrary, there was no reasonable movement toward
community integration, as measured by the actual placement of
qualified persons in less restrictive settings. This limitation on
state discretion both assumes a continuing identification of per-
sons who can live in less restrictive settings, as well as a con-
tinuing expansion of community services in relation to institu-
tional services.
C. The Federal Administrative Response to Olmstead
The federal government has attempted to respond to the
Olmstead decision with a series of clarifying guidance docu-
ments, the provision of technical assistance to States regarding
approaches for developing community services, and other ac-
tions designed to encourage States to embrace the basic thrust
of the decision. As will be discussed at greater length below,
this approach has essentially skirted the profound legal issues
generated by the case.
Despite the fact that Olmstead is an ADA (rather than a
Medicaid) case, the overwhelming importance of Medicaid in
supporting publicly funded health services for persons with dis-
abilities has caused the federal government's response to focus
on this program to the near-exclusion of all other sources of
public financing. Following a letter from then-HHS Secretary
Donna Shalala to the nation's governors regarding the impor-
tance of the decision,49 the Department's initial major policy
statement was a January, 2000 letter to State Medicaid directors
which emphasized avoiding the use of Medicaid to unnecessar-
Id. at 605-06.
49 Health Care Fin. Admin., Secretary's Letter to Governors on Olmstead
Decision (Jan. 14, 2000) (letter from Donna E. Shalala, HHS Secretary, to nation's
governors), available at http'/www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/smd1 140b.htm (on file with
Health Matrix).
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ily institutionalize persons and the availability of Federal Medi-
caid financing to engage in expanded community services.
50
(This emphasis on Medicaid community coverage options has
been repeated throughout the past two years, as evidenced by
subseauent State Medicaid directors letters on Medicaid op-
tions, as well as a detailed handbook on redesigning Medicaid
programs to invest more heavily in community services. 52)
The January, 2000 letter also placed great emphasis on the
notion of a "comprehensive, effectively working plan." 53 The
letter restated what the Court defined as an outcomes test for
measuring the reasonableness of state performance as a process
requirement to actually engage in state planning around com-
munity services:
[T]he Court suggests that a State could establish com-
pliance with [T]itle II of the ADA if it demonstrates that
it has:
" a comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing
qualified persons with disabilities in less restrictive set-
tings, and
* a waiting list that moves at a reasonable pace not con-
trolled by the State's endeavors to keep its institutions
fully populated.54
The Department again advised that "[w]e strongly urge States to
increase access to community-based services for individuals
with disabilities by developing comprehensive, effectively
working plans for ensuring compliance with the ADA.,
55
"o Health Care Fin. Admin., Guidance on Olmstead Decision and Fact Sheet
(Jan. 14, 2000) (letter from Timothy M. Westmoreland, Director of Center for Medi-
caid and State Operations, to all State Medicaid Directors), available at
http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/smdl 140a.htm (on file with Health Matrix).
51 HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVS.,
ADA/OLMsTEAD DECISION STATE MEDICAID DIRECTOR LETrERS (n.d), at httpj/www.
hcfa.gov/medicaid/olmstead/smdtrs.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).52 See GARY SMITH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., UN-
DERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNrrY SERVICES: A PRIMER (Oct. 2000)
(discussing how to "encourage the use of the Medicaid program in a manner that
minimizes reliance on institutions and maximizes community integration in a cost-
effective manner").
53 Health Care Fin. Admin., supra note 49.
54 id
55 Id at encl.
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The letter provided guidance regarding the elements of a
comprehensive, effectively working state plan. The elements
consist of efforts aimed at achieving an inclusive planning proc-
ess and at taking "steps to prevent or correct current and future
unjustified institutionalization of individuals with dis-
abilities. 56 According to the Department, the essential compo-
nents of the plan as it relates to individuals include an individ-
ual assessment process under which:
" The State has a reliable sense of how many individuals
with disabilities are currently institutionalized and are
eligible for services in community-based settings. The
plan considers what information and data collection sys-
tems exist to enable the State to make this determina-
tion. Where appropriate, the State considers improve-
ments to data collection systems to enable it to plan ade-
quately to meet needs.
* The State evaluates whether existing assessment proce-
dures are adequate to identify institutionalized individu-
als with disabilities who could benefit from services in a
more integrated setting.
* The State also evaluates whether existing assessment
procedures are adequate to identify individuals in the
community who are at risk of placement in an unneces-
sarily restrictive setting.
" The plan ensures that the State can act in a timely and
effective manner in response to the findings of any as-
sessment process.57
The guidance also identified as an element an assessment of the
availability of community resources and a measurement of
whether they are sufficient in amount and scope to maintain
community service integration at a reasonable pace.
The January, 2000 guidance reaffirmed the Court's view
that not all persons are capable of living in communities and
that States bear the responsibility and the authority for identify-
ing those who can. At the same time, the guidance added the
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not only those who are institutionalized, but also to those who
are at risk for unnecessary institutionalization. While the guid-
ance focused on individual assessments and services, its main
thrust was aimed at the process of planning, an issue not ad-
dressed at all by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the guidance
did not set forth the minimum elements of the assessment proc-
ess in areas such as initiation of assessments, assessment time-
lines, the validity of assessment tools, the timing of assess-
ments, the capability of persons conducting the assessments, or
minimum due process protections for appealing the results of an
adverse assessment. Finally, the guidance set forth no standards
regarding how the State's allocation of resources to community
services versus institutional care would be measured, nor did it
indicate how "reasonable pace," "fundamental alteration," or
"reasonable modification' would be measured.
Subsequent government documents have expanded the role
of States in refashioning programs to emphasize community
services. An Executive Order issued by the Bush Administra-
tion in July, 2001 directs all federal agencies to undertake thor-
ough reviews to identify policies and procedures that impede
integration, 58 and a notice in the Federal Register invites com-
ments from interested persons on barriers to integration. 59 Both
the Clinton and Bush Administration thus appear to have opted
for an approach that might be termed an "enthusiastic rallying"
around community care (if anything, the Bush Administration
has been more active in this regard), and have shied away from
the more traditional role within the Executive Branch of stan-
dard setting, compliance review, and enforcement actions, al-
though the Executive Order issued by the Bush Administration
also identifies investigation of individual complaints as a high
priority.6
0
M. MOST INTEGRATED SETTING
COMPLAINTS
Because of succeeding Administration's emphasis on popu-
lation-wide planning and the implementation of broad commu-
nity service initiatives, the George Washington University
58 Exec. Order No. 13,217, 66 Fed. Reg. 33,155 (June 18,2001).
59 Announcement of National Listening Session on Community-Based Alter-
natives for Individuals With Disabilities, 66 Fed. Reg. 42,864, 42,864 (Aug. 15,
2001).
60 Exec. Order No. 13,217, 66 Fed. Reg. at 33,156.
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School of Public Health and Health Services, with private foun-
dation support6' and with the assistance of the Office for Civil
Rights (ORC) within HHS, undertook a yearlong review of
"most integrated setting" administrative complaints filed with
OCR under Title II of the ADA.62 While the complaints span the
1996-2000 time period, the great majority of complaints were
filed post-Olmstead; as of the summer of 2001, nearly 400 such
complaints had been filed.
The purpose of the review was to aid the planning process
through the provision of statistical, aggregated descriptive in-
formation regarding the characteristics of individuals who al-
lege ongoing ADA violations as a result of inappropriate failure
to receive services in the most integrated setting. The study was
conducted by the authors of this article using a written review
instrument that was specifically designed to extract and record
relevant information. The categories of information that were
extracted were identified in consultation with OCR officials,
advocates, state officials, and other persons with expertise
and/or interest in the issues. The review categories focused on
geographic location, age, residential status, and living arrange-
ment of the complainant, nature of the claims, disability status
of the claimant, and services sought.
The analysis took place in three cycles over a twelve-month
time period, with approximately 100 complaints reviewed dur-
ing each cycle. A testament to the consistency of the data was
that as the database increased with the completion of each cycle
of reviews, the distribution of responses did not change signifi-
cantly. As of May, 2001, the authors have analyzed a total of
334 complaints.
61 The Center for Health Care Strategies, Inc., in Lawrenceville, NJ, provided
a grant to the Center for Health Services Research and Policy of The George Wash-
ington University School of Public Health and Health Services to conduct research on
issues surrounding the Olmstead decision.
62 28 C.F.R. § 35.190(b)(3) (2000) authorizes the Office for Civil Rights of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to oversee compliance with the
ADA of publicly administered health and human services programs. OCR must in-
vestigate all complaints and attempt to reach resolution. See id. § 35.172. If resolu-
tion is not possible, OCR will issue a Letter of Findings. See id. The filing of a com-
plaint does not preclude the complainant from filing a private action at any time. Id §
35.172(b).
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A. Principal Findings
1. Complaints by Region of the Country and by State
63
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Figure 1 shows that complaints come from all HHS regions,
as well as from virtually all states. This finding is consistent
with the universal nature of the problem and probably also is a
reflection of the widespread nature of advocacy on behalf of
persons with disabilities (both by organizations and family
members).
63 Region I consists of CT (n = 24), ME (n = 0), MA (n = 0), NH (n = 0), RI
(n = 4), and VT (n = 0). Region H1 consists of NJ (n = 1), NY (n = 27) and VI (n = 1).
Region II consists of DE (n = 1), DC (n = 0), MD (n = 18), PA (n = 2) VA (n = 2),
WV (n = 6) and an unknown state (n = 1). Region IV consists ofAL (n = 1), FL (n =
1), GA (n = 34), KY (n = 11), MS (n =1), NC (n = 1), SC (n = 0) and TN (n = 5).
Region V consists of IL (n=16), IN (n = 8), MI (n = 1), MN (n = 10), OH (n = 2), and
WI (n = 10). Region VI consists of AR (n = 4), LA (n = 39), NM (n = 6), OK (n = 8)
and TX (n = 8). Region VII consists of IA (n = 3), KS (n = 1), MO (n = 12) and NE
(n = 2). Region VIII consists of CO (n = 32), MT (n = 3), ND (n = 2), SD (n = 0), UT
(n = 14) and WY (n = 1). Region IX consists of AZ (n = 0), CA (n = 6), HI (n = 0)




The states located in HHS Regions Four, Five, Six, and
Nine account for 217 complaints, or 65% of the total complaints
reviewed. We theorize that the heavy concentration of com-
plaints from these regions is less a reflection of greater prob-
lems in these regions and more a reflection of specific events
triggering a greater level of local advocacy (such as the decision
on the part of a state protection and advocacy agency to spur the
planning process through the systematic filing of complaints). 64
2. Type of Complainant
Supporting our assumption that the heavy concentration of
complaints from certain regions is a reflection of a greater level
of local advocate activity in the community is the fact that ad-
vocacy groups file the majority of complaints on behalf of a
named individual, as indicated by Figure 2. While touring a
nursing home, for example, a representative of an advocacy
group may identify an individual who may be inappropriately
residing in the facility. After informing the individual of the
Olmstead decision, the advocate could encourage the filing of
64 This assumption is bolstered by discussions the authors have had with ad-
vocates and state officials.
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an administrative complaint and prepare such a complaint if as-
sistance is requested. In their complaints, the complainants fre-
quently state that they were spurred to action as a result of just
having learned about the integration mandate and the right to
receive, or even the existence of, community services.
3. Age Range of Complainant
It is not always possible to ascertain the age of the com-
plainant, but among the complaints where age can be discerned,
the evidence suggests that unnecessary institutionalization (or
its risk) affects persons of all ages. The most prevalent age-
range in the data base is 22-64, accounting for nearly one-half,
or 148, of the complaints. At the same time, one-in-seven com-




While the majority of complainants were institutionalized
when they filed their complaints, a significant proportion (30%)
were residing in the community but at risk for what they con-
sidered medically unjustified institutionalization.
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Figure 5 shows that an even higher proportion (41%) of
child and adolescent complainants reside in a community set-
ting but are at risk for what they perceive as medically unjusti-
fiable institutionalization.
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Figure 6 underscores the variable nature of the problems
faced by community residents, in terms of current living ar-
rangements. Well over half (57%) were living with families but
considered themselves to be in danger of medically unjustified
institutionalization in the absence of such assistance. Another
36% were living on their own (either alone or in another form
of arrangement) at the time they filed their complaints. This
graph indicates that living with a family member or members
fails to provide a buffer against medically unjustifiable institu-
tionalization, given the complex and extended supports that may
be required to successfully maintain an individual in his or her
home.
5. Institutional Placement
Figure 7 shows that nursing homes were the single most
common institutional setting among complainants, accounting
for 60% of all complaints filed by institutionalized persons. An-
other 30% arose in psychiatric facilities, a situation similar to
the facts of the Olmstead case itself.
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In the case of children and adolescents, Figure 8 shows that
hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, and psychiatric facilities
comprised the largest number of settings for the complaints
among institutionalized persons.
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In the case on non-elderly adults, nursing home residents
accounted for nearly half of the institutionalized complainants,
as Figure 9 shows.
6. Nature of Complainant's Disability
Figure 10 underscores the wide range of conditions that can
lead to medically unjustified institutionalization or the threat
thereof. The most dominant condition faced by the complain-
ants by far was physical disability: Nearly half of all complain-
ants reported a single diagnosis attached to a physical disability,
while another nearly 10% reported the presence of a physical
disability along with one or more mental disabilities.
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Among non-elderly adults, Figure 11 indicates that the
dominance of physical disabilities was even more pronounced,
present either alone or in combination with a mental disability
of some type in 70% of all cases.
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Figure 12 indicates that in the case of children and adoles-
cents, physical disabilities either alone or in combination with
mental disabilities were present in more than one-third of all
complaints. Compared to adults, the picture for children sug-
gests a greater prevalence of multiple, layered conditions.
Among adults, according to Figure 11, two-thirds report a single
diagnosis, while only approximately 40% of children experience
a single diagnosis. Conversely, among children, over one-third
experience either dual or triple diagnoses; among non-elderly
adults, Figure 12 indicates that only one-quarter experience dual
or triple diagnoses.
7. Service Requests
The 334 complainants made a total of 696 requests for ser-
vices, as indicated by Figure 13, while the average complainant
requested two different services. Regardless of age, complain-
ants reported similar service needs. The following analysis ex-
amines the data surrounding some of the more frequently re-
quested types of services.
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a. In-Home Care
In-home care comprised 45% of the total requests for ser-
vices that the complainants considered imperative for their suc-
cessful placement in the community. For purposes of our analy-
sis, in-home care included personal care services, in-home
health care, and homemaker chores.
b. Housing
Requests for housing services comprised 20% of total ser-
vice requests. For purposes of our review, we grouped general
complaints and complaints concerning affordability, accessibil-
ity, and size into one category.
c. Difficulty with Current Services (Quality or Quantity)
Thirteen percent of the service requests involved difficul-
ties with existing services. In these cases, complainants indi-
cated that they were receiving some level of services, but were
experiencing sufficient difficulty with those services to prompt
a complaint. Often, these individuals had an assessment from
their physician indicating the need for a greater number of hours
than their home health provider was willing to provide. In other
situations, the complaints centered around the poor quality of
available staff.
d. General Request for Services
Six percent of all requests for services indicated only a
need for "general services." This category included those in-
stances where complainants made a request for services, but
failed to indicate their specific needs. The complaints often in-
dicated that the disabled person could live in the community
with "appropriate supports."
e. Educational/Vocational/Occupational Services
Five percent, or 36, of the requests for services included a
request for education, vocational training, or occupational ser-
vices. The requests made under this category usually came from
a complainant under age twenty-one.
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f. Durable Equipment
Our review uncovered twenty-two requests (3%) for dura-
ble equipment. The type of equipment requested included me-
chanical lifts, power wheelchairs, environmental control units,
and home modifications.
g. Service Reinstatement
Three percent of service requests involved a request for resump-
tion of one or more terminated services. In a number of cases,
this request was made by individuals who had been receiving
adequate services, but who found their services reduced or
eliminated when, for example, they entered a hospital for a
short-term stay, or upon a review of their needs by a home
health provider.
h. Evaluation or Treatment Plan
Mindful of the fact that an evaluation by a State's treatment
professional is the first prong of the Court's three-part test to
gain release from an institution, nineteen complainants re-
quested either an evaluation to determine their ability to live in
the community or a treatment plan.
It is important to highlight that the majority of complain-
ants did not request an individual evaluation and treatment plan,
which may indicate that such an assessment had already been
performed. However, where complainants did actually indicate
that an assessment had taken place, they further indicated that
the assessment merely consisted of a single sentence authoriz-
ing community living rather than an extensive assessment of
needs and a description of the resources to be made available.
i. Transportation
Two percent of all requests for services focused on trans-
portation needs. While this number may seem low, we believe
that it reflects the complainant's focus on simply being in a
community, rather than on realizing transportation within one.
B. Policy and Planning Implications
The individuals whose complaints were the subject of this
analysis cannot be said to be representative of the population of
persons with disabilities who could live in the community with
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appropriate support. The very low number of elderly persons
alone suggests an under-representation of certain individuals. At
the same time, this analysis contributes important information
to the Olmstead planning process, because it sheds light on the
needs of individuals who (or whose representatives) sense their
situations acutely enough to take action. As a group, the com-
plainants are concentrated in certain regions of the nation and
tend to be adults with physical disabilities, either standing alone
or in combination with one or more mental disabilities. In view
of the underlying conditions that dominate the complaints, it is
not surprising that adapted housing and in-home health care
dominate the service requests.
While the overall number of children represented in the
data base is low, the presence of any children in the complaint
group is particularly disturbing, given the general belief regard-
ing the benefits of community services for children with dis-
abilities. Children are more likely than their adult counterparts
to reside in communities but their complaints reflect the tenuous
nature of this community residence, with concerns raised over
the potential for institutionalization because of inadequate care.
Also, among children mental disabilities are more dominant.
For both Olmstead planning and more general state health
policy purposes, the implications of the diversity among those
claiming inappropriate institutionalization (or risk thereof), and
their residential status, are considerable. To highlight the point,
consider the fact that the majority of non-institutionalized com-
plainants reside at home with a family member. Seemingly,
even this relatively secure community setting does little to sat-
isfy some disabled individuals that their risk of institutionaliza-
tion is low.
But beyond simply signaling the breadth of the complain-
ants seeking relief under Olmstead, the data are instructive in
more concrete ways applicable to policymaking. As more and
more States move on to the task of devising Olmstead plans, the
data indicate that States might want to pay particularly close
attention to the need for increased in-home health care services,
as well as the fact that a significant number of individuals were
not as interested in gaining access to additional services as they
were in experiencing an upgrade in the quality of their existing
services. Furthermore, our review of the complaints suggests
that planning for adults-who represent the great majority of
complainants in our analysis-would appear to necessitate the
HEALTH MATRIX
creation of additional community housing and increased sup-
ports for persons with physical, as opposed to mental, disabili-
ties.
IV. RELATED MEDICAID LITIGATION
Despite States' arguments that the Medicaid program spe-
cifically encouraged the institutionalization of persons with
mental illness and thus created a defense to claims of an ADA
violation, Olmstead did not directly concern Medicaid at all;
instead, it focused on the lawfulness of state administration of
publicly funded health programs generally. At the same time,
Medicaid represents the largest source of public health care fi-
nancing for low-income persons with disabilities. As a result,
Medicaid figures broadly in States' efforts to reorder public fi-
nancing to fund community services.65 Furthermore, to the ex-
tent that the Medicaid program vests its beneficiaries with sepa-
rate and enforceable federal legal rights related to community-
based health benefits and services, it offers covered individuals
separate legal claims related to the provision of community
care.
A. Background and Overview of Medicaid
To understand the nature of the Medicaid litigation that has
arisen concurrently with ADA claims over the past several
years, it is necessary to review the basic structure of the pro-
gram. A seminal component of the modern U.S. health care fi-
nancing system,66 Medicaid is also one of the most complex
pieces of social welfare legislation ever enacted. In 1998 Medi-
caid insured approximately forty million persons, most of whom
65 In 1995, for example, state and local government expenditures on Medicaid
represented the single largest state and local health expenditure. That year, state and
local governments spent $55.6 billion on Medicaid, compared to $47.1 billion on
premium contributions to employer-sponsored plans and $54.3 billion on other ex-
penditures. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS. HEALTH, UNITED STATES 338 tbl.120 (2001), httpJ/www.cdc.gov/nchs/datal
hus/hus0l.pdf.
66 See Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 7, 8-10 (2001) (reviewing the history of Medicaid as a major contribu-
tor to U.S. health care over the past thirty-five years).
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would otherwise have no access to health insurance because of
age, disability, or lack of attachment to the workforce.
67
Medicaid is a federal grant-in-aid program that entitles eli-
gible persons to coverage for a defined set of medical services
and benefits (known collectively as "medical assistance"). 68
States that participate in Medicaid and administer approved
state plans are entitled to federal financial assistance for the
medical assistance and administrative costs they incur in admin-
istering their programs. The federal contribution level for ad-
ministrative costs averages 50%;69 in the case of medical assis-
tance benefits and services, the federal financial assistance rate
for fiscal year 2002 ranges from 50% to over 83%.70
"A legal entitlement,71 Medicaid provides participating
States with open-ended federal financing to support the costs of
their state programs. Although participating States must comply
with certain federal requirements, state agencies have broad
discretion in the design of their program eligibility, benefit and
coverage structures, and the overall administration of their state
plans (e.g., establishing provider qualification standards and
compensation rates, conducting eligibility determinations and
re-determinations, and so forth).72
Medicaid functions as a health insurance program and thus
also entitles participating providers to payments for covered
services furnished to eligible persons. In rare cases, federal law
establishes substantive payment standards for providers; in gen-
67 KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HENRY J. KAISER FAM-
ILY FOUND., THE MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE (Jan. 2001), http'//www.kff.org/
content/2001/2004b/2004b.pdf.
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(a) (West Supp. 2001).
69 See 42 U.S.C.A § 1396b(a)(2)(B) (providing calculations for amounts ex-
pended for nursing aide training and competency evaluation programs). Federal con-
tributions are higher for certain administrative costs, such as the services of skilled
medical professionals or the cost of establishing and operating computerized man-
agement information systems. Id § 1396b(a)(2)(A),(C).
70 See 3 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 14,905 (Mar. 6, 2001).71 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL
YEARS 2002-2001 ch.4 (Jan. 2001), http:/www.cbo.gov/showdoc/cfin?index=2727&
sequence=5 (discussing means-tested entitlement spending).
72 See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 66, at 17 (discussing requirements
that States administer their programs through a 'single state agency', that eligibility
requirements be made by the state welfare agency, and that outstationing be per-
formed).
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eral, however, payment rates and rules on provider participation
are left to state discretion.73
In order to participate in Medicaid, States must submit
"State plans" to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, which is authorized under federal law to administer the
program. 74 Once approved, the plan qualifies for federal pay-
ments. States typically amend their plans frequently; federal
standards are ambiguous regarding when a state administrative
decision can be effectuated as a matter of state discretion and
without formal federal approval of a "plan amendment." As a
basic matter, however, altering eligibility categories or adding
or removing entire classes of benefits would be considered to be
plan amendments.75
Federal Medicaid law establishes certain conditions with
which state plans must comply in order to receive federal finan-
cial assistance. In the context of this article, the most important
conditions relate to eligibility and coverage.
At a minimum, States must extend coverage to certain per-
sons known as "mandatory categorically needy" individuals.76
States also may cover certain "optional categorically needy"
persons 77 and may also extend coverage to the medically needy,
a group of individuals that falls into a categorically needy class
but whose income and resources exceed categorically needy fi-
nancial eligibility thresholds.78
One of the mandatory categorically needy coverage groups
consists of all persons who meet the eligibility standards for
Supplemental Security Income (SSI),79 a means-tested federal
cash entitlement program under the Social Security Act that ex-
tends subsistence-level benefits to low-income persons whose
disability is severe enough to preclude substantial gainful em-
ployment. 80 This test of disability-the virtual inability to
work-is significantly more narrow than the functional test of
73 Id at 23.
74 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (West 1995).
75 See 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(1)(ii) (2000) (stating "material changes" will
cause aplan to be amended).
6 See id. §§ 435.100-.170; see generally Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note
66, at 17-20 (discussing eligibility).
'n See 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.200-.236.78 See id. §§ 435.300-.350.
'9 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(l) (West Supp. 2001).
80 See id § 1382(a) (listing eligibility requirements).
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disability that applies under the ADA and that, in its application
to employment, is predicated on the assumption of work. 1
At their option, States can elect to adopt a more liberal
definition of disability (e.g., one that utilizes the ADA func-
tional test rather than the more narrow "inability to work"
test).82 States also may at their option adopt more liberalized
financial eligibility standards for persons with disabilities.
8 3
Most have elected not to do so, however, presumably because of
the cost related to the program, as well as States' discomfort
with the expansion of a legal entitlement that obligates them to
furnish comprehensive coverage to all eligible individuals who
satisfy the state plan conditions of eligibility. Despite the gen-
erosity of federal financial contribution levels, the strain on
state budgets of an open-ended legal entitlement to medical care
services is significant.84
Regardless of whether a State defines eligibility broadly or
narrowly, federal law specifies that "medical assistance... be
furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individu-
als."'85 It is in fact this "reasonable promptness" standard, cou-
pled with the entitlement nature of the program and program
coverage standards, that has served as a springboard to much of
the related Medicaid litigation discussed below.
State Medicaid programs must cover certain "required"
services for categorically needy beneficiaries. 86 At their option,
they also may cover numerous additional categories of services,
known as "optional" services. 87 However, whether required or
optional, all federally enumerated benefits found within the
definition of medical assistance are mandatory for individuals
81 For the ADA's definition of disability, see supra Part ILA.
'2 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(e)(3)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 2001).
8See id § 1396a(r)(2)(A).
84 In its analysis of Medicaid, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) esti-
mates that Medicaid spending will reach some $295 billion by 2011, with annual
average rates of cost increases significantly above general inflation (8.6%). CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 71. The CBO specifically notes legal challenges under
the ADA as a factor in this rapid cost increase, as litigation causes States to expand
Medicaid spending on persons with disabilities. Id
85 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(8).
8 See id §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396d(a)(1)-(27).
8 See 42 C.F.R. § 440.225 (2000). For an overview of Medicaid mandatory
and optional benefits, see KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SUMMARY OF MEDICAID "MANDATORY" AND "OP-
TIONAL" ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFITS (Aug. 2001), http://www.kff.org/content/2001/
4002/4002.pdf.
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under age twenty-one under Medicaid's special pediatric com-
ponent, known as Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and
Treatment (EPSDT). 88 Furthermore, in the case of both required
and optional services, Medicaid's "comparability" provisions
require that all categorically needy persons be covered for the
same classes of benefits.89
The most important required services for purposes of this
article are nursing facilities 9° and home health care services. 91
Benefits commonly utilized by persons with serious chronic ill-
ness and disability and that qualify for federal assistance as op-
tional benefits include intermediate care facility services for
persons with mental retardation and related developmental dis-
abilities,92 personal care services,93 physical, speech, and occu-
pational therapy and other rehabilitation services, 94 private duty
nursing care, 95 and prescribed drugs. 96 The federal statute and
regulations specify definitions for most covered benefits. 97
These definitions would control state coverage design decisions.
As noted previously, federal financial participation is prohibited
in the case of services furnished by institutions for mental dis-
ease.
As a general matter, both required and optional forms of
medical assistance benefits are subject to certain statutory and
regulatory tests of reasonableness. 98 Under these tests medical
necessity utilization management criteria may be employed, 99
but a State may not set fixed limits on the number of individuals
who may receive a particular class of service. States also must
88 Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 66, at 22; SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL.,
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. MED. CTR., NEGOTIATING THE NEW HEALTH SYSTEM: A
NATIONWIDE STUDY OF MEDICAID MANAGED CARE CONTRACTS vol. 1 (Ctr. for Health
Servs. Research and Pol'y, 2000), available at http'/www.gwu.edu/-chsrp/; see also
42 U.S.C.A §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(l), 1396d(a)(4)(B), 1396d(r).
'9 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(B).
90 See id § 1396d(a)(4)(A).
9' See id § 1396d(a)(7).
92 See id § 1396d(a)(15).
93 See id. § 1396d(a)(24).
94 See id § 1396d(a)(11), (13).
95 See id § 1396d(a)(27).
96 See iL § 1396d(a)(12).
97 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.1-.185 (2000) (definitions).
9' See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(17) (requiring a plan to include "reasonable
standards" for determining eligibility); 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (2000) (requiring each
service reasonably achieve its purpose).
99 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d).
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ensure that utilization and coverage criteria result in services
that are "sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to reasonably
achieve [their] purpose" and may not discriminate in the provi-
sion of required benefits on the basis of an individual's diagno-
sis or condition. 100 Medicaid's rules of coverage, as well as the
individuals who receive benefits, set the program radically apart
from conventional insurance.101 Unlike private insurance,
which, in the absence of state law regulating the content of cov-
erage, permits arbitrary service limits tied to certain condi-
tions,' Medicaid functions under the rule of reasonableness in
recognition of the special health needs of so many of its benefi-
ciaries.
However, an exception to Medicaid's "amount, duration
and scope" rules and comparability of services requirements is
found in the Medicaid home and community-based care waiver
program.103 This program permits States to furnish expanded
coverage for care and services presumably not otherwise found
in a state plan'0 4 to certain designated sub-groups of elderly and
disabled beneficiaries. 10 5 Home and community-based care
waiver services and benefits are designed to assist individuals
who, in the absence of home care, would require institutional
level services and benefits.
10 6
As of 2000, virtually all States operated at least one Medi-
caid home and community care waiver program for at least one
'0o Id. § 440.230(b)-(c).
101 See generally Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 66, at 16-25 (presenting
a legal overview of Medicaid).
102 See generally Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir.
1999) (holding insurance policies that put a cap on medical care benefits for those
with HIV did not violate the ADA); McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th
Cir. 1991) (holding employer did not violate ERISA when it reduced the maximum
benefits payable to AIDS-infected employees). For a discussion of the limits of pri-
vate insurance coverage, particularly in cases of persons with chronic illness and
disability, see RAND E. ROSENBLATT, SYLVIA A. LAW, & SARA ROSENBAUM, LAW
AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (1997 & Supp 2001-2001).
103 See 3 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 14,625 (presenting broad
discussion of requirements and limitations under the waiver program).
104 There is no requirement that services listed as part of the State's waiver
program be limited exclusively to persons receiving waiver services. However, the
statute identifies certain services that may be furnished pursuant to a home and com-
munity care waiver (e.g., case management, homemaker services, home health aide
services, personal care, habilitation, and respite care). Id.
106See id. (listing federal requirements that can be waived, as well as exam-
ples of waivers in individual States' waivers).106Id [ 14,625.31.
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category of elderly or disabled beneficiaries. 10 7 In operating
home and community care waiver programs, States may vary
the benefits they offer by beneficiary sub-category (that is, they
may restrict aid to certain types of disabilities or to certain age
groups of beneficiaries). 108 States may also, with the permission
of the Secretary of HHS, establish fixed upper limits on the
number of individuals within any group of beneficiaries eligible
for the services who may receive "waiver" care. 1° 9 This means
that there may be waiting lists of persons who qualify for
waiver services (i.e., who in the absence of these services re-
quire institutional care), but who exceed the number of ap-
proved slots or, alternatively, who, as in Olmstead, exceed the
number of approved and funded slots.
Once approved, home and community care waiver services
become part of a State's approved State Medicaid plan and all
"non-waivable" conditions of federal participation (such as the
promptness of medical assistance requirements) apply.
Medicaid contains no statutory individual right of action;
however, settled jurisprudence permits litigants to bring claims
against state officials for violation of statutory legal rights es-
tablished under § 1983.110 Similarly, courts have consistently
held that under the doctrine of Ex parte Young1 1' beneficiaries
and providers affected by the conduct of state officials can seek
prospective injunctive relief.112 Over the decades since Medi-
caid's enactment in 1965, countless lawsuits have been brought
'
07 See id H[ 14,625.35, 14,625.55 (state summaries).
108 See id 14,625 (discussing how States may waive federal requirement for
comparability and "statewideness").
109 Id
11o See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (holding health
care providers could bring an action for declaratory and injunctive relief to insure
State compliance with the Boren Amendment). For a review of the role of § 1983 in
litigation to enforce Federal Medicaid rights, see Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Courts,
Health Care Reform, and the Reconstruction of American Social Legislation, 18 J.
HEALTH POLS. PoL'y & L. 439,457,460,467-68 (1993).
... 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
112 See Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (reaffirm-
ing and discussing the Ex parte Young doctrine, but finding it inapplicable in this
particular case); Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
(recognizing the validity of permitting prospective relief pursuant to Ex parte Young,
but holding the need to vindicate the supreme authority of federal law is not present
when the claim is that the state official violated state, rather than federal, law); Hutto
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (holding a lower court's prospective relief power
includes the issuing orders to enforce a prospective injunction).
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under § 1983 to compel state compliance with the terms of the
Federal Medicaid statute and with federally secured rights.
Finally, the financial consequences of Medicaid to a State
must be emphasized. Because Medicaid is a legal entitlement,
once a State settles on its state plan, it must furnish medical as-
sistance up to the full limits of the plan. Unlike a discretionary
program, a State cannot refuse to fund a portion of its plan (i.e.,
fund only certain plan services or cover only certain plan eligi-
bles). A State may of course submit amendments to the Secre-
tary of HHS reducing the categories of eligible persons served
or eliminating or reducing benefits, but as long as the state plan
is in effect, beneficiaries have a legal right to its coverage in
accordance with federal requirements.
B. The Medicaid Community Care Cases
The Medicaid community care cases lie at the intersection
of state plans for medical assistance (including institutional and
non-institutional care services, mandatory and optional state
plan services, and waiver services) and the federal prompt assis-
tance statute. These cases focus on the right of Medicaid bene-
ficiaries to receive home and community care services, as well
as other types of services related to the long-term care of per-
sons with disabilities covered under their States' Medicaid plan,
with reasonable promptness."13 These cases consistently have
found an enforceable right in the structure of the Medicaid stat-
ute's coverage and reasonable promptness requirements; fur-
thermore, they have rejected, as neither permissible under
Medicaid nor a colorable fundamental alteration claim under the
ADA, a defense related to the cost of complying with plaintiffs'
request for timely medical assistance services that are covered
under the plan." 4 While the Medicaid prompt assistance cases
113 See Doe v. Chiles, 136 F. 3d 709 (1lth Cir. 1998); Boudreau v. Ryan, No.
00 C 5392, 2001 WL 840583 (N.D. Ill May 2, 2001); Makin ex rel Russell v. Hawaii,
114 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D. Haw. 2000); Lewis v New Mexico Dep't of Health, 94 F.
Supp. 2d 1217 (D.N.M. 2000), afftd, 261 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 2001); Boulet v Cel-
lucci, 107 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass. 1999); Benjamin H. v. Ohl, No. 3:99-0338, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22469 (S.D. W. Va. July 15, 1999); Cramer v. Chiles, 33 F. Supp.
2d 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1999); see generally, Jennifer Mathis, Community Integration of
Individuals with Disabilities: An Update on Olmstead Litigation, 25 MENTAL &
PHYSIcAL DISABILrY L. REP. 158 (2001) (reviewing case law interpreting Olmstead).
114 See Doe, 136 F.3d at 716-718; Cramer, 33 F.2d at 1354. Cases rejecting
the cost defense as impermissible in the case of services covered under the State
Medicaid plan all emanate from Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Harris, 617 F. 2d
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are remarkably unified in their analysis, there are indications
that the very ability of Medicaid beneficiaries to bring individ-
ual actions to enforce federal rights may be under increasing
judicial scrutiny as part of the "federalism jurisprudence" that
has taken decisive hold over the past decade.1 15 For example,
the availability to plaintiffs of § 1983 in Medicaid litigation was
recently called into question by a federal district court in
Michigan in the case of Westside Mothers v Haveman.116 The
Westside Mothers court found that § 1983 does not form the ba-
sis of actions to enforce Medicaid state plan requirements, be-
cause the statute is simply a contract between sovereign gov-
ernments and its requirements are thus enforceable against a
State only through actions brought by the Secretary of HHS. In
the court's view, Medicaid beneficiaries are no more than
"third-party beneficiaries" to a public contract, a status that is
not recognized under §1983.117 The court further ruled that the
Ex Parte Young doctrine does not cover actions for prospective
injunctive relief against State Medicaid officials because such
actions are in reality suits against States proscribed by the Elev-
enth Amendment. 118
In light of the Supreme Court's established jurisprudence
regarding the relationship between federally secured rights un-
der the Social Security Act (and other spending clause statutes)
and individual enforcement actions under § 1983, it is difficult
to imagine that the Westside Mothers defense will achieve broad
judicial acceptance. Indeed, the Olmstead case itself involved
an individual challenge brought under Title II of the ADA,
which like § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is based on Con-
gress's Spending Clause power. At the same time, the recent
trend toward diminished federal legal powers and expanded
state sovereignty has been striking, and the court's decision in
Westside Mothers may in fact command an appreciable follow-
ing.
388 (5th Cir. 1980), the first case to reject insufficiency of funds as a defense to a
state plan enforcement action.
"15 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureau-
cratic Power, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1225 (2001) (discussing how in forbidding damages,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents state agencies from using federal man-
dates to enlarge their own budgets).
116 133 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
"
7kId at 557.
118 See id. at 560-574 (providing four reasons why Ex parte Young is inappli-
cable).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Olmstead decision is one of the important landmarks in
the movement toward achieving the goals of enlightened dis-
ability policy in the United States. The ADA is as much a na-
tional policy statement about the full social integration of per-
sons with disabilities as it is a body of legally enforceable oper-
ating rules that bind the public and private sectors. To be sure,
recent judicial decisions under the ADA in the area of public
and private employment suggest greater constraints on enforce-
ability than envisioned at the time of enactment. But these deci-
sions should not be allowed to cause policy makers to lose sight
of the fundamental thrust of the ADA or its embodiment of
strong popular sentiment regarding how the world should relate
to persons with disabilities.
At the same time, applying the ADA to the complexity of
public health care spending raises tremendous conceptual and
legal difficulties. Because the federal government has elected to
pursue an "enthusiastic" support role for voluntary state reforms
rather than pure enforcement strategies, it seems that relatively
definitive answers will come only through further litigation.
This is unfortunate, perhaps, depending on one's point of view,
because it encourages a high level of litigation and much re-
gional uncertainty and inconsistency.
One obviously key area lies at the intersection of the ADA
and the Medicaid statute. In the case of both Medicaid and pri-
vate health insurance, it now appears to be settled law that de-
mands for alteration in the design of coverage itself qualify for
a "fundamental alteration" defense. Once a court determines
that what plaintiffs seek is a restructuring of the design of an
insurance program, whether public or private, the fundamental
alteration defense appears to be available. 119 However, because
the concept of insurance design is potentially so broad (apply-
ing to every conceivable aspect of insurance, from eligibility to
coverage, cost-sharing, provider compensation, and administra-
tion), the consequence of its use to trigger the fundamental al-
119 See Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
that a State is not obligated to provide benefits to a particular group when it does not
provide the benefits to any group); Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557,
560 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing how a cap on medical benefits for HIV-infected bene-
ficiaries is only refusing to make a service as valuable to a disabled person as to a
nondisabled person, and not violative of the ADA).
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teration defense is that virtually every claim for modification of
insurance practices would be swallowed by the defense. This
liberal use of the concept of "design" relegates the ADA's dis-
tinction between reasonable modifications and fundamental al-
terations meaningless.
One case in particular illustrates the propensity of courts to
allow the concept of design to claim all aspects of insurance
modifications as a fundamental alteration. In Rodriguez v City
of New York, 120 Medicaid beneficiaries with mental illness chal-
lenged the refusal on the part of the city and State to pay for
cueing services furnished by personal attendants in the home
unless they were furnished as an incident to other services re-
lated to the treatment of a physical disability. Plaintiffs alleged
that without payment for cueing services on a stand-alone basis,
they risked the very lack of in-home support that could result in
their institutionalization.
With virtually no analysis, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit accepted the defendants' assertion
that the plaintiffs challenged a coverage limitation and thus
sought a remedy that involved a matter of insurance design,
thereby triggering a fundamental alteration defense. 121 However,
the court could have just as easily accepted the notion that the
challenge did not involve coverage design (particularly since
personal care services were undeniably covered under the New
York State Medicaid plan) and instead focused on how the State
was administering its approved coverage design. The heart of
the case concerned the State's failure to pay for a covered ser-
vice on a stand-alone basis, not its failure to cover the service at
all. The decision whether to pay for a covered procedure on a
stand-alone basis or merely as an incident to another procedure
would appear to be precisely the type of administration question
that Title II of the ADA aims to reach.
Thus, the "design" approach is an unsatisfactory means of
distinguishing between requests for insurance practices that in-
volve fundamental alterations and those that are merely reason-
able modifications. Particularly in the case of Medicaid, whose
funding availability is so dispositive of the opportunity to re-
ceive community-based health care, there needs to be a more
satisfactory framework.
'20 197 F.3d 611 (2d Cir. 1999).
121 See id at 618-19.
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One possible starting point might be to consider as poten-
tially a "fundamental alteration" any change in Medicaid poli-
cies, practices, and procedures that under federal rules require
approval under the Federal Medicaid state plan amendment
process before they can qualify for federal financial participa-
tion. Alterations that trigger an obligation to file a state plan
amendment might at least raise a presumption of a fundamental
alteration that rises above day-to-day administration.
Federal regulations pertaining to the state plan amendment
process specify that plans must be amended "whenever neces-
sary to reflect-[c]hanges in Federal law, regulations, policy
interpretations, or court decisions; or [m]aterial changes in state
law, organization, or policy, or in the State's operation of the
Medicaid program." 12' The question thus becomes what is a
"material" change that at least potentially triggers a fundamen-
tal alteration defense under the ADA.
In PGA Tour, Inc. v Martin,123 which involved the obliga-
tion under the ADA of the Professional Golf Association to
permit a golfer with a disability to use a cart, the Supreme Court
ruled that a fundamental alteration for purposes of the ADA is
one that changes the essential character of a program or activity
(in this case, the game of golf). Assuming that this definition of
"fundamental alteration" would be equally relevant under Title
II, then for purposes of the ADA, Medicaid state plan revisions
that alter a basic characteristic of the State's Medicaid program
(e.g., adding an eligibility or benefit category, recognizing a
new class of qualified providers, or changing cost-sharing rules)
might be considered the types of material changes that amount
to a fundamental alteration in the nature of the State's program.
Other changes, such as permitting beneficiaries to receive
greater levels of an already-covered service under revised utili-
zation management criteria, fully funding a service that is al-
ready identified as covered under the state plan, or expanding
the circumstances and settings in which a covered benefit can
be obtained (e.g., permitting a covered service to be furnished
in additional locations such as schools or homes in order to ac-
commodate the needs of persons with disabilities), would not
amount to the types of material changes that trigger a funda-
mental alteration defense. Even were the change one that trig-
'22 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(1)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added).
123 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
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gered the need to file a plan amendment, it would not change
the basic character of the State's program.
This approach to fundamental alteration jurisprudence is
obviously factually intensive and involves weighing the nature
of the proposed change against the overall structure and opera-
tion of a State's Medicaid plan. It also involves a determination
of whether the change is considered "material" by the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services for federal financial
participation purposes under Medicaid; such a determination
would be relevant but not necessarily dispositive of the question
for ADA purposes, since what may be material in the context of
Federal Medicaid financing may not "fundamentally alter" the
character of a State's program in a way that triggers the funda-
mental alteration defense.
Another major area of focus concerns the power of States
to establish the process of individual assessment and treatment
planning. The Olmstead decision vests States with the authority
to decide for whom community living is appropriate and the
range and level of services that are necessary to make the com-
munity arrangement appropriate. 124 Although the federal guid-
ance essentially encourages States to address this issue as part
of their planning process, it offers no minimum due process
standards for the assessment procedure itself. The guidance is
silent on matters ranging from the duty to initiate or respond to
assessments, the timing of the assessment, the nature of the
process, evidentiary standards governing the assessment and
any assessment instruments that are used, and questions of bur-
dens of proof. Similarly, no procedural standards exist for the
development of treatment plans, nor are there standards govern-
ing the content of plans.
As with the issue of fundamental alteration, there surely are
models that can serve as a basis for designing standards for in-
dividualized assessments and treatment planning. Examples can
be found in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 125
which entitles children with disabilities to a free and appropriate
education and requires assessments and the development and
oversight of treatment plans, as well as the provision of long-
124 Since the State of Georgia at one point discharged one of the plaintiffs in
Olmstead to a homeless shelter, this allocation of powers seems a bit jarring. On the
other hand, since the issue at stake is eligibility for publicly funded benefits, vesting
the State with this authority appears inevitable.
' 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491o (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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term institutional care services in Medicaid, which since 1987
has obligated States to utilize pre-admission screening and
treatment planning procedures.
Finally, there is the question of "reasonable pace." As
noted, some courts have begun to address this issue, but as of
yet, there are no general standards for measuring what consti-
tutes a "reasonable pace" for purposes of Olmstead-related
planning, nor is there an explanation regarding how the reason-
able pace standard might vary depending on the nature of the
condition or service need at issue. For example, the review of
the most integrated setting complaints identified housing for
persons with serious physical disabilities as an enormous unmet
need. The permissible "reasonable pace" standard in developing
this type of housing might be much slower than the standard
that should be tolerated in the case of persons with physical dis-
abilities who can return to a family home with relatively simple
adaptations and in-home health support.
Because so many important issues remain unresolved, it is
difficult to know how far Olmstead will take this latest genera-
tion of efforts to achieve full community integration for persons
with disabilities. Certainly the case underscores the primacy of
integration as the national goal. Furthermore, the decision
represents a potentially major advance in disability case law in
its establishment of a measurable outcome standard as a legal
benchmark. But how to operationalize this outcome is very dif-
ficult. To achieve integration at a reasonable pace eventually
requires the restructuring of Medicaid, as well as the augmenta-
tion of existing federal funding and options to States through
financial incentives that encourage investment in restructuring.
Examples of such incentives are raising the federal contribution
rate in the case of services furnished to persons with disabilities
in homes and community settings, 126 providing incentives for
States to expand the definition of disability to approximate that
used in the ADA itself, and removing barriers to the use of
Medicaid to pay room and board costs in the case of persons
whose physical disabilities make adapted residences essential
(under current law, Medicaid can pay for room and board costs
essentially only when an individual is a resident of a licensed
126 Cf 42 U.S.C. § 1397aa-1397jj (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (governing the
State Children's Health Insurance Program which provides funds to States to provide
health coverage to low-income children); 42 U.S.C.A §1396a(aa) (West Supp. 2001)
(expanding funding for certain breast and cervical cancer patients).
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medical facility). Making these service changes and federal fi-
nancial enhancements is costly, but if the nation is serious about
actively pursuing the statement of national policy that is embod-
ied in the ADA, these changes would appear to be basic.
